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1 |  INTRODUCTION
What did you used to care about most? What do you care most 
about today? And what do you think you will care about most 
in the future? We can learn a lot by asking ourselves these ques-
tions. McAdams' (2001) review outlined how evolving autobi-
ographical narratives underpin the core of our identity. When 
we get the chance to reflect, key questions about our journey 
through life can tell us a lot about who we are and who we want 
to be. For example, did I really used to worry about that when 
I was younger (past)?; how can I get what matters to me now 
(present)?; and, where do I see my life heading (future)? It is 
clear that our motivations change over the course of our lives, 
either due to general maturation or experience of significant 
events. Furthermore, we can make estimates about how our pri-
orities have changed and will change in the future.
While the literature on narrative identity intricately ex-
amines this component of change over time (e.g., Adler & 
McAdams, 2007), research on values has yet to address how 
people perceive their values over time. We thus wanted to 
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Abstract
Objective: Extant research mostly treats values as being stable over time. Our re-
search examined how people perceive values over time and whether or not these 
perceptions reflect motivational tensions between theoretically opposing values. We 
also assessed the viability of examining values over time to predict well-being and 
future intentions.
Method: Four studies (N = 934) asked participants to report their values across past, 
present, and future settings. These temporal trajectories were analyzed across the 
four types of higher-order values: self-transcendence, self-enhancement, openness, 
and conservation. Studies 3 and 4 assessed associations with well-being. Study 4 as-
sessed associations with self-reported behavior over time.
Results: Across all four studies, participants perceived their values as being dynamic 
over time. Younger participants' trajectories did not reflect the motivational con-
flicts typically reported in values research, but Study 4 showed potential awareness 
in older age groups. Variability in temporal values correlated with well-being, par-
ticularly for openness values. Future values predicted future intentions, even when 
controlling for present values.
Conclusion: This novel method of examining values provides new understanding 
into how people perceive the pursuit of values over time. Additionally, we show 
two ways that a temporal values measure can offer new insights into well-being and 
future intentions.
K E Y W O R D S
behavioral intentions, value stability, value structure, values, values over time, well-being
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explore whether people see their values as generally stable or 
dynamic across the lifespan, and how these trajectories vary 
for different value types. Perhaps more provocatively, we also 
wanted to test whether these perceptions map onto the moti-
vational trade-offs that have been consistently found to occur 
between values, (e.g., concern for the self and concern for 
others). When looking over time, we might fail to predict our 
values in a way that reflects conflicts between values we wish 
to pursue simultaneously—conflicts that we do recognize 
when constrained to view them in one time point (Schwartz 
et al., 2012). In addition to laying the foundations for under-
standing temporal value structures, we also wanted to explore 
how these value trajectories have theoretical utility for un-
derstanding well-being and self-reported behavior over time.
1.1 | Value structure
Rokeach's (1973) seminal theory of values has been pivotal to 
understanding value structure and value change. According to 
Rokeach, value change is likely only when people perceive a 
conflict between their values and the self-concept. Consistent 
with this perspective, previous research has tended to assume 
that values are essentially stable, particularly in the short-term, 
but can vary to some degree when people are faced with new 
situations that force personal change and adaptation (Bardi 
et  al.,  2009; Rudnev,  2014). For instance, in a longitudinal 
study, it was found that students shifted away from extrinsic 
values over their college career (Sheldon,  2005). The chal-
lenges of aging may also explain why and how values change, 
with age correlating positively with conservation values and 
negatively with openness values (Caprara et al., 2003; Milfont 
et al., 2016; Robinson, 2013). In sum, any temporal changes in 
value importance are likely to occur either because of a change 
in the person's external environment, or because of a signifi-
cant change in their internal motivation.
But the perception of value change and the directional-
ity of these perceptions is an interesting open question. Very 
little research has considered whether people see their own 
values as changing over time and none has examined if such 
changes occur in particular directions. Schwartz's (1992) in-
fluential cross-cultural model of values helps to illustrate 
the importance of this issue. According to the theory, values 
express motives that can be mapped in a circular model. In 
this circular structure, competing motivations appear op-
posite one another and complementary motivations appear 
close together (see Figure 1). The precise number, definition, 
and structure of each value in the model has varied from its 
initial foundation (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987) to more recent 
revisions (Schwartz et al., 2012). However, the broader dimen-
sions from self-transcendence to self-enhancement and from 
openness to conservation have remained essentially the same. 
Furthermore, the validity of the circular structure is reflected 
by evidence of tensions across the circle. For example, people 
who attach more importance to self-transcendence values also 
attach less importance to self-enhancement values (Schwartz 
& Sagiv, 1995).
The model has been highly influential (see Maio, 2016) be-
cause of empirical support in over 80 nations around the world 
(Schwartz et  al.,  2012), and the values included within the 
model help to predict a range of social attitudes and are sensi-
tive to the surrounding social context (Boer & Fischer, 2013). 
For example, individuals who were higher in openness val-
ues and lower in conservation values were more ready to em-
brace out-group contact (Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995). However, 
the most important evidence supporting the model directly 
examines its assumptions about the circular pattern of moti-
vational relations between values. The structure has a wealth 
of supporting evidence from a range of samples and contexts 
(see Schwartz et  al.,  2012), across cross-sectional (Bardi & 
Schwartz, 2003; Bilsky et al., 2011), experimental (e.g., Maio, 
Pakizeh, et al., 2009; Pakizeh et al., 2007), and neuroimaging 
paradigms (e.g., Brosch et al., 2011; Leszkowicz et al., 2017).
Perhaps most pertinent to our research, the model helps to 
predict patterns of value change: when values have been shown 
to change over time, the pattern of change shows that values 
at opposite ends of the circle change in opposing directions 
and, consequently, the value structure is maintained (Bardi 
et al., 2009; Vecchione et al., 2016). Thus, the circular structure 
is found across a range of situations and remains valid even when 
people change the importance they attach to different values.
A final important point to note is that two main methods 
of analyzing values data exist (see Borg & Bardi, 2016). First, 
as Schwartz (2009) generally recommends, researchers can 
F I G U R E  1  Circular model of values, adapted from Schwartz 
et al. (2012)
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look at mean-centered (or ipsatized) data. There are two main 
advantages to this format that are relevant to our research. 
One advantage is that it allows for comparison of individuals 
while controlling for variation in their use of the response 
scale. The other advantage is that it allows researchers to as-
sess which values have changed in relative importance. The 
second method of measurement (see He et al., 2017; He & 
van de Vijver, 2015), is to look at the raw scores. The main 
advantage of this format is that it more likely reflects a direct 
representation of a participant's values and avoids the pitfalls 
of removing potentially meaningful variance from the mean 
rating (Borg & Bardi, 2016). For our purposes it is important 
to look at both formats, as we are introducing a novel method 
of assessing values within-persons, which could impact upon 
both approaches. It is plausible that participants could both 
predict raw changes in value importance over time, as well as 
shifting relative value priorities within each time point.
1.2 | Value stability and change over time
A fundamental question is whether people perceive tensions 
between theoretically opposing values (e.g., wealth and equal-
ity) when they consider their own values over time. Important 
consequences emanate from how people perceive their moti-
vations as changing from past to present to future. Some per-
ceived trajectories can differ substantially from actual temporal 
change, but they remain relevant to attitudes and behavior. For 
example, individuals who place greater emphasis on consid-
ering future consequences are more likely to exercise and eat 
healthily (Dassen et al., 2016; Joireman et al., 2012). Similarly, 
past and potential selves are independent predictors of future 
task performance (Elliot et al., 2015). In addition, self-evalua-
tions differ when the future is projected as close or distant, but 
in varying directions (Heller et al., 2011; Wilson et al., 2012). 
Some evidence indicates that there is greater positivity toward 
close future selves compared to distant future selves (Wilson 
et  al., 2012). Other research, however, indicates that there is 
greater positivity toward self-concepts placed in the distant fu-
ture, compared to the near future (Heller et al., 2011). While 
there are substantial and meaningful differences between the 
theoretical foundations of the self-concept and values, such 
evidence does suggest a broader need to continue to refine our 
understanding of self-perceptions over time.
Interestingly, no research has yet assessed the role of dif-
ferent values perceived in the present as a contrast to values 
in the past or future. The closest methodological match is one 
study in Quoidbach, Gilbert, and Wilson's work (2013) where 
they asked participants to report how much they thought they 
had changed ten basic values from 10 years earlier, or to pre-
dict the change in these values in 10 years' time (no partici-
pants assessed past, present, and future simultaneously). Their 
“End of History Illusion,” also found in personality traits, 
showed that people reported comparatively more change 
from their past than they predicted change into their future. 
However, because only absolute changes between past-pres-
ent or present-future were analyzed, this research offers an 
interesting overview of how people view aspects of their 
selves as temporally fluid, but it does not provide detail on 
how those values interact over time, the direction of change, 
nor how such motivations may be necessarily in competition 
with one another.
1.3 | Values and well-being
People's perceptions of values over time may be linked to 
their well-being. Psychological well-being is a multifaceted 
construct with three key components: life satisfaction, af-
fective well-being, and psychological flourishing (Diener 
et  al.,  2010). Life satisfaction can be measured using the 
Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS), which taps into cogni-
tive judgments of well-being (Diener et al., 1985). Affective 
well-being can be measured using the Scale of Positive 
and Negative Experience (SPANE), which identifies the 
current strength of emotional states (Diener et  al.,  2010). 
Psychological flourishing can be measured with the 
Flourishing Scale (FS), which captures the extent to which 
people feel they are functioning well in important areas of 
human life (Diener et  al.,  2010). All three components are 
considered in our exploration of values and well-being.
Some researchers consider personal values to be relevant to 
every aspect of well-being, because values necessarily interact 
with the subjective experiences that contribute to each individ-
ual's happiness (Felce & Perry, 1995). That is, people receive 
joy from different things, and these differences can be captured 
by knowing their values and their social context. Consistent 
with this link, Sagiv and Schwartz (2000) found business stu-
dents to have a positive relationship between power values and 
well-being, while the relationship was negative for psychology 
students. Similarly, students who considered achievement val-
ues to be highly important reported greater well-being when 
they experienced success in terms of academic performance, 
while students who strongly valued hedonistic values were 
happier on days they had gone to a party (Oishi et al., 1999). 
In both these studies, the sizes of the relations were mostly 
small (r < .25). Research has also highlighted the impact of 
broader socio-political settings upon the values-well-being 
relationship, with more individualistic settings increasing the 
role of the openness-conservation dimension, while attenuat-
ing the role of the self-transcendence-self-enhancement di-
mension (Sortheix & Schwartz, 2017). In sum, to understand 
the link between values and well-being, it is important to 
know the value orientations of the individual, relevant details 
of the social context, and to consider different components of 
well-being (Burr et al., 2011).
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In the field of narrative identity, links between well-be-
ing and temporal perspective have been found, but it is noted 
there is a paucity of research assessing how unity and coher-
ence of self-identity relate to well-being (Adler et al., 2016). 
While it is important to note that the theory and methodology 
of studying self-identity and values are substantively differ-
ent, it does offer a plausible foundation for finding associa-
tions between perceptions of values over time and well-being. 
For our purposes, the relationship between perceived value 
trajectories over time and psychological well-being was an 
interesting new issue. Stability in values over time may re-
flect a current contentment with past and predicted selves, 
or a perceived lack of progress from the past and openness 
for change in the future. As an exploratory avenue, we there-
fore wished to ascertain whether greater perceived stability 
in value trajectories also predicted well-being in general, 
and whether this impact depended on other factors such as 
the individual's age and the dimension of well-being being 
evaluated.
1.4 | Present research
In four studies, we explored perceptions of values over time 
by asking participants to rate the importance of their val-
ues in the past, present, and future. Many procedures force 
participants to consider a specific point in the past or the 
future (e.g., Quoidbach et al., 2013; Ryff, 1991; Wilson & 
Ross,  2001). For the first three studies, we chose to avoid 
specifying exact time points. Specific time points make peo-
ple mindful of situational pressures of that specific time. For 
instance, students may think of specific dates in the recent 
past that possess specific contextual factors (e.g., graduation, 
exams). By deliberately eliciting a more general perspective, 
we enabled participants’ abstract motives and beliefs to influ-
ence their reported value trajectories. However, to test how 
our novel method compares to comparable procedures that 
do specify time points, we included this approach in Study 4.
We had two primary and four secondary aims across the 
studies. The first primary aim was to test whether people 
see their values as stable or dynamic (i.e., are there signif-
icant changes in value importance across the past, present, 
and future, or do people assign similar levels of importance 
to each value at each time point?). The second primary aim 
was to test whether theoretical models of values that presup-
pose opposition between values were supported by people's 
own forecasted progress. The secondary aims were to test if 
asking people to report their values over time would impact 
upon value importance in the current context (i.e., compared 
to a standard measure); to test how stability of values related 
to current well-being; to test if future values could predict 
behavioral intentions; to test whether perceived value trajec-
tories were moderated by age.
Based on related previous research (Quoidbach 
et  al.,  2013), we assumed a small-to-medium effect size 
(f = .175) between past, present, and future values (repeated 
measures ANOVA). A power analysis using GPower 3.1.9.4 
revealed that to detect such an effect with a power of .95 a 
sample size of at least 86 is required (assuming a correlation 
of .50 between past, present, and future values). Thus, we 
aimed to recruit at least 86 participants per study.
2 |  STUDY 1
Our first study tested whether there are particular directions of 
perceived value change over time and whether these percep-
tions align with Schwartz's model. To enhance the possibility 
that participants would perceive potential opposition between 
values over time, we only presented participants with values 
that oppose one another in the model (i.e., self-transcendence 
vs. self-enhancement, or openness vs. conservation). One 
potentially important moderating variable, the Preference for 
Consistency (PFC) scale (Cialdini et al., 1995), was included 
at the end of the design. There were no reliable effects of 




Participants were 124 undergraduate students at a British uni-
versity (117 women, 7 men) who took part for course credit. 
They were between 18 and 28 years of age (M = 21). All 
participants completed the study in the laboratory.
2.1.2 | Design
A mixed design was used. All participants completed an 
adapted version of the Schwartz (1992) Values Scale (SVS), 
which assessed the importance attached to values over time.2 
Participants were randomly assigned to complete a version 
that examined the self-transcendence and self-enhancement 
dimension or a version that examined the openness and con-
servation dimension. Time (past, present, and future) was the 
within-participant factor.
2.1.3 | Procedure
Participants completed the values measurement using pen 
and paper in individual laboratories. After completing the 
task, participants were debriefed and thanked.
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2.2 | Materials
An adapted version of the (SVS) was used to measure how 
participants saw their values as changing over time (see 
Appendix A for an example of the layout used). By placing 
the time points side-by-side and in chronological order, the 
task encouraged participants to draw a trajectory over time 
for each value. Participants either received 10 values repre-
senting the self-transcendence (helpfulness, responsibility, 
forgiveness, equality, and honesty) and self-enhancement 
(power, wealth, success, ambition, and influence) values, or 
they received 10 values representing the openness (creativ-
ity, adventure, curiosity, an exciting life, and a varied life) 
and conservation (politeness, moderate tendency, respect for 
tradition, obedience, and devotion) values. For each value, 
participants were asked to rate the importance of each value 
as a guiding principle in their life in the past, present, and 
future. Answers were provided on a scale from −1 (opposed 
to my values) to 7 (of supreme importance).
To provide value scores for each motivational domain, 
the five values in each domain were averaged at each time 
point separately (past, current, and future). Cronbach's α var-
ied from .69 to .77 for self-transcendence values, .62 to .71 
for self-enhancement values, .51 to .61 for openness values, 
and .56 to .59 for conservation values. Although some of 
these α coefficients were low (Lance et al., 2006), they were 
comparable with other research using shortened versions of 
the SVS (e.g., Lindeman & Verkasalo,  2005), particularly 
given the breadth of value type that each score necessarily 
encompasses and the long-established validity of the measure 
(Sortheix & Lönnqvist, 2014).
2.3 | Results and discussion
To test for variability over time, a repeated-measures anal-
ysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted for each set of 
values. Figure 2 shows the raw data for each set of values 
over time for all four studies, with 95% confidence inter-
vals to compare mean differences across time points. The 
within-participants contrasts for self-transcendence values 
showed a linear effect, F(1, 61) = 112.02, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .65, and a weaker, but significant quadratic effect, F(1, 
61) = 8.99, p < .01, partial η2 = .13, such that the values 
were rated as increasing in importance over time, but to a 
lesser extent between current and future. The within-partic-
ipants contrasts for self-enhancement values also showed a 
linear effect, F(1, 61) = 159.50, p < .001, partial η2 = .72, 
but no significant quadratic effect, F < 1, p = .79, partial 
η2  =  .001; thus, these values were rated as increasing in 
importance over time. The within-participants contrasts for 
openness values showed a linear effect, F(1, 60) = 22.32, 
p  <  .001, partial η2  =  .27, and no quadratic effect, F(1, 
60) = 2.18, p = .15, partial η2 = .03; thus, these values were 
rated as increasing in importance over time. The within-
participants contrasts for conservation values showed no 
significant linear effect, F  <  1, p  =  .60, but there was a 
relatively weak quadratic effect, F(1, 60) = 4.70, p = .03, 
partial η2 = .07, such that the values were rated as higher 
in both the past and the future, compared to current im-
portance. We discuss the asymmetric effects between past, 
present, and future in the General Discussion.
2.4 | Summary
These results indicate that participants perceived a shift over 
time in the importance they attribute to a range of values. 
There was a reliable tendency for most values to be seen as 
increasing in importance over time, with conservation val-
ues being the exception. Furthermore, participants did not 
show evidence for value oppositions over time. For instance, 
participants reported that both self-transcendence and self-
enhancement values increase in importance to them over 
time. These two value types normally change in opposite di-
rections: as either value type grows in importance, the other 
decreases in importance (Bardi et al., 2009; Maio, Pakizeh, 
et al., 2009). However, our participants reported these values 
as though they could pursue both sets of values concurrently. 
It is worth noting that this pattern does not simply reflect a 
process of general value inflation over time, because the con-
servation values did not show the same effect. These data 
thus provide intriguing evidence that participants are com-
fortable reporting the escalating pursuit of potentially con-
flicting values.
3 |  STUDY 2
Study 2 thus sought to address two methodological limita-
tions of Study 1. First, having asked participants to respond 
to only opposing value types, it was now useful to ask par-
ticipants to respond to all values, and hence, gather data that 
could be centered around each participant's mean value rat-
ings, as Schwartz (2009) generally recommends for group 
mean comparisons. Second, it was important to test how 
responses to the temporal values measure compared to re-
sponses to a control condition. This was a novel compari-
son, with no specific a priori predictions about the direction 
of potential differences. However, this contrast would allow 
us to explore whether the temporal perspective offered by 
our new measure caused participants to change the level of 
importance participants attached to each value in the current 
context.
6 |   FOAD et Al.
3.1 | Method
3.1.1 | Participants
Participants were 92 undergraduate students at a British uni-
versity (85 women, 7 men) who took part for course credit. 
They were between 18 and 26 years of age (M = 19).
3.1.2 | Design
A mixed design was used. Type of values measure was the 
between-participant factor (temporal contrast, standard) 
and time (past, present, future) was the within-participant 
factor.
3.1.3 | Procedure
Participants completed the study on computers in group ses-
sions in a laboratory. They first completed the randomly as-
signed values measure. Next, for purposes unrelated to this 
report, participants completed items asking about behavioral 
examples related to the values.3 Finally, in the temporal con-
trast condition, participants were asked to note the ages they 
were contemplating when considering the past and future 
F I G U R E  2  Absolute importance attributed to values over time (raw values); ST = Self-transcendence, SE = Self-enhancement, OP = 
Openness, CO = Conservation
   | 7FOAD et Al.
contexts4 and whether they imagined being employed, par-
enting, and in a relation in the future context. Afterward, par-
ticipants were probed for suspicion, debriefed, and thanked 
for their time.
3.1.4 | Materials
The SVS scale was similar to Study 1, except that it contained 
20 items representing both dimensions of the scale (self-tran-
scendence—self enhancement and openness—conservation), 
rather than just one of the dimensions (as in Study 1). 
Participants either completed the standard SVS, which asked 
only for their current rating of each value, or they completed 
the temporal contrast SVS, which asked for their rating of 
each value in the past, present, and future. As in Study 1, it 
was necessary to combine the five value scores representing 
each dimension at each time point. Reliability estimates at 
each time point were similar to Study 1: Cronbach's α var-
ied from .66 to .78 for self-transcendence values, from .51 to 
.78 for self-enhancement values, from .74 to .81 for openness 
values, and from .62 to .72 for conservation values.
F I G U R E  3  Relative importance attributed to values over time (centered value scores); ST = Self-transcendence, SE = Self-enhancement, 
OP = Openness, CO = Conservation. Note that the design of Study 1 prevented the calculation of centered scores
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3.2 | Results and discussion
Figure  2 presents the overall pattern of value ratings, ex-
cluding the control group. The figure reveals a similar pat-
tern of results as obtained in Study 1. This conclusion was 
supported by repeated-measures ANOVAs on the value rat-
ings for each type of values. The within-participants con-
trasts for self-transcendence values revealed a linear effect, 
F(1, 45) = 60.72, p < .001, partial η2 = .57, and a quadratic 
effect, F(1, 45)  =  22.08, p  <  .001, partial η2  =  .33. The 
within-participants contrasts for self-enhancement values also 
showed a linear effect, F(1, 45) = 77.64, p <  .001, partial 
η2 = .63, and a weaker, but significant, quadratic effect, F(1, 
45) = 4.44, p = .04, partial η2 = .09. The within-participants 
contrasts for openness values showed a linear effect, F(1, 
45) = 27.40, p < .001, partial η2 = .38, and a quadratic effect, 
F(1, 45) = 17.91, p < .001, partial η2 = .29. The within-partic-
ipants contrasts for conservation values showed no significant 
linear effect, F < 1, p = .89, partial η2 < .01, and a significant 
but relatively weak quadratic effect, F(1, 45) = 4.94, p = .03, 
partial η2 =  .10. Replicating the patterns from Study 1, the 
strongest effects over time were linear for self-transcendence, 
self-enhancement, and openness values, and a weak quadratic 
effect was detected for conservation values. Overall, the ef-
fects over time replicated and extended Study 1.
The second goal of the study was to use mean-centered 
values scores. Figure 3 presents the pattern of centered data 
for each set of values for Studies 2, 3, and 4. For this study, re-
peated-measures ANOVAs examined the mean-centered data 
for each set of values. The within-participants contrasts for 
self-transcendence values revealed a significant linear effect, 
F(1, 45) = 4.85, p = .03, partial η2 = .10, and a significant 
quadratic effect, F(1, 45) = 6.19, p = .02, partial η2 = .12. 
The within-participants contrasts for self-enhancement 
values showed a linear effect, F(1, 45)  =  24.81, p  <  .001, 
partial η2 = .36, and no significant quadratic effect, F < 1, 
p =  .74, partial η2 <  .01. The within-participants contrasts 
for openness values showed no linear effect, F < 1, p = .52, 
partial η2  =  .01, and a significant quadratic effect, F(1, 
45) = 5.92, p = .02, partial η2 = .12. The within-participants 
contrasts for conservation values showed a linear effect, F(1, 
45) = 84.29, p < .001, partial η2 = .65, and a quadratic effect, 
F(1, 45) = 27.81, p < .001, partial η2 = .38.
These results provide an interesting contrast to the raw 
data. Looking at the relative (rather than absolute) value im-
portance for each domain over time, the strongest effects are 
an upward effect for self-enhancement values and a down-
ward effect for conservation values. This pattern of data is 
particularly interesting given the wealth of evidence for the 
circular structure of the values contained within the SVS. The 
raw data from Studies 1 and 2 suggest that participants did 
not consciously see the oppositional nature of each set of val-
ues. The mean-centered data in Study 2 also suggest that such 
opposition is not present, even though centering focuses on 
relative changes in value importance. Thus, even though cen-
tering affects the plotted angle of value change, more crucial 
is that the patterns between values indicate again that percep-
tions of value change over time do not reveal the same mo-
tivational relations between values as have been found when 
examining actual value changes over time (Bardi et al., 2009; 
Vecchione et al., 2016).5
The second goal of this study was to test whether completion 
of the temporal contrast ratings of values yields current ratings 
that differ from current ratings that are made without the tem-
poral contrast being salient. As Table 1 illustrates, participants 
in the temporal contrast condition raised the importance of their 
values in the present over participants in the control condition, 
although this effect was reliable only for openness values. That 
Temporal 
contrast Standard
t Cohen's dM (SE) M (SE)
Self-transcendence 5.37 (0.14) 5.24 (0.13) −0.70 −0.15
Self-enhancement 4.28 (0.14) 4.18 (0.10) −0.60 −0.13
Openness 5.02 (0.17) 4.03 (0.17) −4.10** −0.86
Conservation 3.47 (0.17) 3.04 (0.16) −1.87† −0.39
All Values 4.54 (0.11) 4.12 (0.09) −2.88** −0.61
Self-transcendence (centered) 0.84 (0.08) 1.12 (0.10) 2.15* 0.45
Self-enhancement (centered) −0.25 (0.10) 0.05 (0.09) 2.25* 0.47
Openness (centered) 0.48 (0.12) −0.09 (0.14) −3.10** −0.65
Conservation (centered) −1.07 (0.12) −1.08 (0.11) −0.11 −0.02




T A B L E  1  Comparing data from the 
temporal contrast SVS to standard SVS
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is, thinking about values over time enhanced the perceived im-
portance of openness values in the current context.
We checked whether these differences from the control 
condition also arose in the mean-centered value scores. 
Table 1 shows that the centered data revealed different effects 
from the raw value scores. Participants who considered their 
values over time significantly increased the importance they 
attached to openness values, similar to the raw data. However, 
as the centered data within a time point are necessarily rel-
ative in nature, decreases in centered value importance are 
needed to balance any such change. Here, the decreases in 
centered importance occurred for self-transcendence and 
self-enhancement values, but this was not accompanied by a 
decrease in the importance they attached to the motivation-
ally opposing, conservation values. Interestingly, these data 
also show participants did not report conflict across the value 
dimensions. In comparison to the control group, participants 
who thought about the temporal trajectories of their values 
clearly increased the importance they attached to openness 
values in the current context, but manifested decreases only 
on the independent value dimension from self-transcendence 
to self-enhancement and not on the opposing conservation 
values.
3.3 | Summary
Study 2 replicated the patterns found in Study 1. Values 
were again perceived as increasing over time, except when 
we examined conservation values. The mean-centered 
data revealed a polarized version of the pattern, with par-
ticipants projecting a rise in self-enhancement values and a 
fall in conservation values over time. Of importance, nei-
ther the raw data nor the centered data provided evidence 
that the participants saw theoretically opposing values as 
being in competition in their changes over time. Finally, 
completion of the temporal contrast significantly enhanced 
the perceived importance of openness values in the cur-
rent context, compared to when participants completed the 
standard values measure.
4 |  STUDY 3
The first two studies provided consistent evidence that 
participants saw the majority of their values increasing 
in importance over time, without counterbalancing up-
ward changes in some values with downward changes in 
the motivationally opposing dimension. Study 3 attempted 
to replicate this pattern in a larger sample, while testing 
whether the stability of participants’ values over time is 
associated with subjective well-being, and whether this as-
sociation differs across value types. This analysis is novel 
and exploratory, but we hypothesized that participants who 
report more variability in their values over time may also 
report lower well-being, as such variability could reflect 
less satisfaction with chosen value importance across the 
lifespan. Variability was operationalized with the within-
person standard deviation of past, present, and future val-




Participants were 198 first-year undergraduate students at a 
British university (175 women, 23 men) who took part in a 
pretest research session during their induction week. They 
were between 17 and 50 years of age (M = 19).
4.1.2 | Design
A correlational design was used. All the participants com-
pleted the temporal contrast measure of values and three 
measures of well-being.
4.1.3 | Procedure
The research was presented as two separate studies within 
a large testing session, wherein participants completed a di-
verse range of psychological measures on computer for other 
researchers, in addition to the measures used in our research. 
Accordingly, participants were free to complete the measures 
in any order they preferred. Participants were debriefed and 
thanked after completion of the session.
4.1.4 | Materials
The same temporal contrast measure of values was used 
as in Study 2. In addition, three scales were used to meas-
ure well-being. The first measure was the Satisfaction with 
Life Scale (SWLS), which measures cognitive judgments 
of well-being (Diener et al., 1985). Example items included 
“In most ways, my life is close to ideal” and “So far, I have 
gotten the important things I want in life.” Participants 
responded using a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree), and the five items formed a single reli-
able factor (α = .88). The second measure was the Scale of 
Positive and Negative Experience (SPANE), which iden-
tifies current emotional well-being (Diener et  al.,  2010). 
Example items for positive emotions included “happy,” 
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“joyful,” and “good” and example items for negative emo-
tions included “sad,” “angry,” and “bad.” Participants were 
asked to think about how much they had experienced each 
feeling over the last four weeks. Participants responded 
using a scale from 1 (very rarely or never) to 5 (very often 
or always). The positive emotions (α = .88) and negative 
emotions (α = .84) formed reliable factors, as did the com-
bination of both scales (α = .87) (to calculate the SPANE 
overall score, the negative items are reverse coded). The 
third measure was the Flourishing Scale (FS), which cap-
tures the extent to which people feel they are functioning 
well in important areas of human life (Diener et al., 2010). 
Example items included “I lead a purposeful and meaning-
ful life” and “I am competent and capable in the activities 
that are important to me.” Participants responded using a 
scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), and 
the five items formed a single reliable factor (α = .86). We 
also calculated a well-being index, which is a composite 
of the SWLS, SPANE, and FS after each item has been 
standardized (α = .84).
4.2 | Results and discussion
We tested whether the raw value scores replicated the ef-
fects from the first two studies. The pattern of raw data 
neatly aligned with the previous results (see Figure 2). A 
repeated-measures ANOVA for self-transcendence values 
showed a linear effect, F (1, 197) = 202.30, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .51, and a weaker quadratic effect, F (1, 197) = 49.32, 
p < .001, partial η2 = .20. The within-participants contrasts 
for self-enhancement values also showed a linear effect, F 
(1, 197) = 265.41, p < .001, partial η2 = .57, and a weaker, 
but reliable, quadratic effect, F (1, 197) = 9.63, p <  .01, 
partial η2 = .05. The within-participants contrasts for open-
ness values showed a linear effect, F (1, 197)  =  104.61, 
p  <  .001, partial η2  =  .35, and a quadratic effect, F (1, 
197) = 43.12, p < .001, partial η2 = .18. The within-partic-
ipants contrasts for conservation values showed a margin-
ally significant linear effect, F (1, 197)  =  3.47, p  =  .06, 
partial η2 = .02, and no significant quadratic effect, F < 1, 
p = .86, partial η2 < .01.
Having found consistency in the raw value scores across 
studies, we tested whether the pattern of centred data from 
Study 2 was also replicated (see Figure 3). A repeated-mea-
sures analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the self-transcen-
dence values revealed significant linear, F (1, 197) = 13.17, 
p  <  .001, partial η2  =  .06, and quadratic effects, F (1, 
197) = 9.70, p <  .01, partial η2 =  .05. The within-partici-
pants contrasts for self-enhancement values showed a linear 
effect, F (1, 197) = 79.00, p < .001, partial η2 = .29, and no 
significant quadratic effect, F < 1, p = .50, partial η2 < .01. 
The within-participants contrasts for openness values showed 
no linear effect, F < 1, p = .25, partial η2 = .01 and a sig-
nificant quadratic effect, F (1, 197) = 10.67, p < .01, partial 
η2 = .05. The within-participants contrasts for conservation 
values showed a linear, F (1, 197) = 156.74, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .44, and a quadratic effect, F (1, 197) = 37.20, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .16.
These raw and mean centered effects were very similar to 
those in Study 2, providing a robust foundation for our sec-
ond aim, which was to look at the relation between perceived 
value variability and well-being (see Tables  S1 and S2 for 
zero-order correlations at each time point). For the raw value 
scores, while in the hypothesized direction, associations be-
tween values and the well-being measures were inconsistent 
and mostly nonsignificant (see Table S9). The only exception 
was a marginal correlation between conservation values and 
satisfaction with life, r(196) = −.14, p = .059. Similarly, for 
the centered value scores, most results were in the hypothe-
sized direction but nonsignificant (see Table S9). However, 
variability in openness was associated with satisfaction with 
life, r(198) = −.19, p = .007; and variability in self-transcen-
dence was marginally associated with satisfaction with life, 
r(198) = −.12, p = .085.
5 |  SUMMARY
The results from Study 3 replicated the patterns obtained in 
the first two studies. These patterns continue to show that 
people do not encompass motivational oppositions between 
values within subjective perceptions of their own value 
change over time. In addition, we found that perceived vari-
ability in openness values was associated with lower well-
being—a finding we test again in Study 4 and address further 
in the General Discussion.
6 |  STUDY 4
Study 4 aimed to replicate and extend Studies 1–3 in a larger 
sample from the general public. The aims were fourfold. 
First, we explored whether the results would be different 
if participants think about 10 years in the past and future, 
rather than at a self-chosen time-point. Consequently, we 
compared responses to the past, present, and future between 
a condition that asked participants to think about 10 years in 
the past and in the future versus a condition wherein the past 
and future time points were self-chosen (as in Studies 1–3). 
Second, we explored whether participant age is associated 
with how participants perceive their past and future values, 
because goals and perspective change later in our lifespan 
(Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999), potentially alter-
ing our predictions for future value change. Third, we tested 
whether past and future values would predict past and future 
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self-reported behavior better than present values. If future 
values explain variance above and beyond present values, 
this would make a case for measuring future values when 
the research aim is to predict expected behavior at the future 
time point. This possibility would be interesting in light of 
evidence that values are stronger predictors of distant future 
behavior intentions than temporally proximal behavioral in-
tentions (Eyal et al., 2009). Fourth, we tested whether value 
variability would predict well-being in a more diverse sam-
ple than in Study 3.
6.1 | Method
6.1.1 | Participants
To explore age effects across the lifespan, we aimed to re-
cruit 100 participants from each of the following five age 
groups: 18–25 years, 26–35 years, 36–45 year, 46–55 years, 
and 56–65 years. However, because we explicitly excluded 
students (to test for generalizability beyond a student sample), 
our recruitment agency was only able to recruit 40 partici-
pants from the youngest age group. We recruited 120 partici-
pants from each of the remaining four age groups, after all 
participants who failed an instructional manipulation check 
item were excluded. As an additional quality check, we tested 
whether internal consistencies (i.e., alphas) for several of the 
response scales would be lower for the fastest or slowest 5% 
of participants. As this was not the case, we collapsed across 
response duration. Participants were 520 people from the gen-
eral public (314 women, 200 men, 3 other, 3 prefer not to 
say) who took part online (Mage = 44). One-hundred fifty-six 
participants had an educational degree below an Advanced 
level U.K. secondary school leaving qualification (A level), 
121 were holding an A-level as their highest qualification, and 
243 were holding a university degree (bachelor, master, PhD).
6.1.2 | Design
A mixed design was used, with temporal constraints (yes, no) 
and age group as the between-participant factors and time 
(past, present, future) as the within-participant factor.
6.1.3 | Procedure
Participants were contacted through a paid recruitment ser-
vice. Participants first completed the temporal contrast 
measure of values, then well-being measures and a behavior 
measure, followed by items assessing political perspective6 
and demographics. Upon completion, participants were de-
briefed and thanked for their time.
6.1.4 | Materials
In the no-constraint condition, we used the same temporal 
contrast measure of values as in Study 3. In the time-con-
straint condition, participants were instructed to think about a 
time point 10 years ago, the present, and in 10 years' time. To 
measure well-being, we used the same three scales as in Study 
3: Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener et  al.,  1985), Scale 
of Positive and Negative Experience (Diener et  al.,  2010), 
and Flourishing Scale (Diener et al., 2010). In addition, we 
measured optimism with the revised 6-item Life Orientation 
Scale (Scheier et al., 1994). Example items included “In un-
certain times, I usually expect the best" and “If something 
can go wrong for me, it will” (reversed coded). Participants 
responded using a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). To reduce blind responding, four filler 
items were included in this scale.
To assess past, present, and future behavior, we derived 
four behaviors for each of the four higher order values that 
would be relevant to the U.K. public, similar to Bardi and 
Schwartz (2003). Example behaviors include “Supporting 
charities with your time or money” (self-transcendence), 
“taking interest in British history” (conservation), “making 
decisions on behalf of other people” (self-enhancement), and 
“buying new foods that you haven't tried before” (openness). 
All 16 behaviors can be found in Appendix B. Internal con-
sistencies of all scales are reported in Tables S7 and S8.
6.2 | Results and discussion
First, we tested whether temporal constraints affected the 
past, present, and future values, using a series of between-
subject t tests. None of the t tests were significant for either 
raw or centered data (Tables  S3 and S4), thus, for all re-
maining analyses we collapsed across both conditions. Also, 
no gender differences were found, so we collapsed across 
gender.
This study's second aim was to test for age effects. To do 
this, we performed mixed-ANOVAs on each of the four high-
er-order values, with age group (18–25, 26–35, 36–45, 46–
55, and 56–65 years) as the between-participant factor and 
time (past, present, future) as the within-participant factor.7 
The interactions in all four mixed-ANOVAs were significant, 
p < .001 (see Supporting Information for details). We there-
fore tested in a series of within-subject ANOVAs whether the 
pattern found in Studies 1–3 replicated across age groups, 
first using the raw scores (Figure 2 and Table S5). To simul-
taneously avoid a focus on small contrasts and to control for 
multiple-comparisons, we changed our alpha-level from .05 
to .005.
For self-transcendence values, we found significant lin-
ear and quadratic contrasts for all but the oldest age group: 
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participants rated their future self-transcendence values as 
most important and their past values as least important. For 
openness values, we found mixed results. We found linear 
effects for participants between 18–25 years and 56–65 years, 
but in a reversed order: while the youngest participants rated 
their present openness values higher than their past values, 
this pattern was the opposite for the oldest of our participants. 
Also, for participants between 18 and 25-years, we found a 
quadratic effect: present openness values were rated as most 
important. For self-enhancement values, we found linear 
contrasts for all age groups except for the 36–45-year-old 
participants. Interestingly, while 18–25 and 26–35-year-old 
participants rated their past self-enhancement values as least 
important and their future self-enhancement values as most 
important, this pattern was reversed for the three older age 
groups. Additionally, we found significant quadratic contrasts 
for the 18–25-year-old participants and the 56–65-year-old 
participants, who rated their present and future self-enhance-
ment values to be more similar on average than their past and 
present values. For conservation values, we only found sig-
nificant linear contrasts for the oldest group: they believed 
their conservation values would decline in importance.
Next, we tested whether we find the same effects using the 
centered scores (Figure 3 and Table S6), again using a stricter 
alpha-level of .005. For self-transcendence values, we found 
significant linear and quadratic contrasts for all groups: par-
ticipants rated their future self-transcendence values as most, 
and their past values as least, important. For openness values, 
we again found mixed results. While all age groups rated their 
past openness values as higher in importance than their future 
values, with the present values mainly in between, this trend 
only reached statistical significance for participants between 
26 and 35-years. For participants between 46 and 55-years, 
we found a quadratic but no linear effect: present openness 
values were rated as least important. For self-enhancement 
values, we found linear contrasts for all age groups except 
for the 26–35-year-olds. Interestingly, while 18–25-year-old 
participants rated their past self-enhancement values as least 
important and their future self-enhancement values as most 
important (with the present values in the middle), this pattern 
was reversed for the three older age groups. Additionally, we 
found significant quadratic contrasts for the 36–45-year-old 
participants and the 56–65-year-old participants, who rated 
their present and future self-enhancement values to be more 
similar on average than the past and present values. For con-
servation values, we found linear contrasts for the two young-
est age groups and the oldest group. While the two youngest 
age groups believed that their conservation values would be-
come less important over time, the oldest age group believed 
their conservation values would become more important. For 
the two youngest groups, we also found significant quadratic 
trends, with the present and future values again being per-
ceived as more similar than the past and present values.
Overall, we again replicated the prior evidence from Studies 
1–3 for the youngest age group in both the raw value ratings 
and the centered value ratings, but this pattern differed for older 
participants. Given this context, we set out to meet the study's 
third aim by correlating past, present, and future values with 
past, present, and future self-reported behaviors. We report our 
findings across all age groups because age did not moderate 
the association between values and self-reported behavior, nei-
ther for raw value and raw behavior scores, nor centered values 
and centered behavior scores, (ps ≥ .05). The correlations be-
tween values and self-reported behavior were in general large 
for the raw scores and somewhat smaller for the centered scores 
(Tables  S7 and S8). Overall, the correlations were strongest 
if value and time were consistent (e.g., past values with past 
self-reported behavior of the same value).
To explore whether future raw values predict future raw 
behavioral intentions better than present values, we ran four 
regression analyses—one per higher order value—with future 
intentions as the outcome and the present and future values as 
predictors. Future self-transcendence-related intentions were 
neither predicted by present nor future self-transcendence 
values (βp = .17, p = .13, and βf = .17, p = .14; subscript “p” 
refers to present and “f” to future values). In contrast, future 
openness intentions were not predicted by present values, 
but were predicted by future openness values (βp = −.08, p 
= .35, and βf = .38, p < .001). Future self-enhancement in-
tentions were predicted strongly by future self-enhancement 
values, and somewhat by present values (βp = −.25, p = .004, 
and βf =  .68, p <  .001). Finally, future conservation inten-
tions were only predicted by present, but not future values 
(βp = .52, p < .001, and βf = −.22, p = .07). Overall, future 
values are uniquely relevant in predicting future intended 
openness and self-enhancement-related intentions, while 
present values were uniquely linked to future intentions for 
conservation behavior.
We ran the same regression analyses for the centered 
value and self-reported behavior scores. Future self-tran-
scendence-related intentions were predicted by future but 
not by present self-transcendence values (βp = .08, p = .30, 
and βf = .19, p = .02). Similarly, future openness-related in-
tentions were predicted by future but not present openness 
values (βp = −.03, p = .64, and βf = .28, p < .001). Future 
self-enhancement-related intentions were predicted strongly 
by future self-enhancement values and more weakly by 
present self-enhancement values (βp = −.22, p <  .001, and 
βf =  .59, p <  .001). Finally, future conservation-related in-
tentions were predicted both by future and present conser-
vation values (βp = .17, p = .04, and βf = .21, p = .007). In 
sum, centered future values explained significant variance in 
future intentions above present values across all four higher 
order value types.
The study's fourth aim was to test whether a link between 
value variability and well-being could be established in our 
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more diverse sample (compared to Study 3) (see Tables S7 
and S8 for zero-order correlations at each time point). 
Variability was again operationalized with the standard de-
viation of past, present, and future values, separately for each 
of the four higher-order value types. For the raw value scores, 
variability in openness was consistently associated with less 
satisfaction with life, r(517) = −.20, p < .001, less positive 
emotions, r(517)  =  −.13, p  =  .004, more negative emo-
tions, r(517) = .11, p = .01, less flourishing, r(517) = −.14, 
p =  .001, and less optimism, r(517) = −.11, p =  .01. This 
suggests that people whose openness values are more vari-
able report lower well-being. Associations between the other 
three values and the well-being measures were inconsistent 
and mostly nonsignificant, rs ≤ .09, ps ≥ .03. For the centered 
value scores, variability in openness was again consistently 
associated with satisfaction with life, r(517) = −.15, p < .001, 
positive emotions, r(517)  =  −.10, p  =  .03, negative emo-
tions, r(517) = .13, p = .002, and flourishing, r(517) = −.09, 
p =  .04. Variability in self-transcendence and conservation 
values were also negatively associated with satisfaction with 
life, r(518) = −.12, p =  .004, and r(517) = −.10, p =  .02. 
In sum, these results demonstrate an important relationship 
between perceived temporal value variability and well-be-
ing, with replication of the association between variability in 
openness values and satisfaction with life found in Study 3.
6.3 | Summary
The results from Study 4 mainly replicated the temporal value 
patterns obtained in the first three studies. Instructing partici-
pants to think about their values at a specific time point did not 
change the pattern of value ratings across past, present, and 
future. Interestingly, however, the pattern of results was mod-
erated by age. Younger participants (nonstudents; under 35) 
assumed that their self-enhancement values would increase, 
while older participants assumed they would decrease; the re-
versed pattern was found for conservation values. Furthermore, 
future values proved useful in predicting future behavioral 
intentions, even when controlling for present values. Finally, 
participants with greater variability in values, particularly in 
the openness dimension, reported lower well-being.
7 |  GENERAL DISCUSSION
In relation to our primary aims, the four studies provided 
consistent evidence that people perceive their values as 
changing over time. At the same time, perceived value tra-
jectories rarely express the motivational conflict seen across 
diverse research paradigms. Of particular relevance, a num-
ber of studies have indicated that self-transcendence and 
self-enhancement values change in opposite directions, as do 
openness and conservation values (Bardi et al., 2009; Maio, 
Pakizeh, et al., 2009). In all four of the present studies, how-
ever, younger participants viewed their self-transcendence, 
self-enhancement, and openness values as all becoming more 
important over time. Only the conservation values were per-
ceived as unchanging. The absence of motivational conflict 
in value trajectories occurred when we examined both raw 
and centered data. Even when we isolated directly opposing 
values (Study 1), participants still did not evidence the poten-
tial opposition over time. Together, these findings indicate 
that the motivational conflicts that are expressed in values 
are not reflected in people's subjective perceptions of how 
their values change over time. When considering values over 
time, younger people (under 35) expect that most values can 
simultaneously grow in importance.
Nonetheless, it was not the case that asking about values 
from a temporal perspective merely invoked an upward lift 
in all values, nor for all ages. Across the lifespan, conser-
vation values were relatively stable in importance. Unlike 
the other values, conservation values focus on protecting 
the status quo by protecting safety and security. In contrast, 
self-transcendence, self-enhancement, and openness values 
have the capacity to engage growth motivations (Schwartz 
et al., 2012). Thus, the value trajectories reflect a need for 
progress and growth and not a need for further protection 
of the status quo.
A final important point about the value trajectories is that 
the differences between past and present were generally larger 
than between present and future. This result replicates the 
aforementioned research by Quoidbach and colleagues (2013), 
showing variability in values decreases with age. While our 
methodology asked the participants to draw trajectories across 
three time points, and we thus cannot isolate the time points 
independently, future work could examine the past-present 
and present-future differences in between-participant designs, 
to confirm how these gaps vary when projections are made in 
only one temporal direction (toward past or future).
In terms of our secondary aims, our findings indicate that 
the temporal values measure matters in at least four further 
ways. First, assessing values over time led to increased im-
portance being attached to openness values—it thus offers a 
novel intervention for anyone interested in making openness 
values salient. Second, we found raised correlations between 
variability in openness values and well-being in Studies 3 and 
4, demonstrating that greater variance in values over time is 
associated with lower current satisfaction with life. Third, we 
found in Study 4 that the prediction of future intentions is en-
hanced by asking about future values. This evidence extends 
prior observations that it is important to consider temporal 
focus in questions predicting behavioral intentions from val-
ues (Eyal et al., 2009). Here we show that the temporal match 
can be augmented by placing the values items in the same 
temporal frame as the behavioral intentions items. Fourth, we 
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found that the subjective value trajectories vary between peo-
ple of different ages. This result fits prior theory on changes in 
socioemotional selectivity as we age (Carstensen et al., 1999).
7.1 | Limitations and future directions
Although our research establishes a consistent pattern of 
value trajectories and demonstrates some important conse-
quences of these trajectories, this novel method of assess-
ing values over time is necessarily at an early, exploratory, 
and somewhat descriptive stage. There are thus a number of 
limitations to consider. While we have shown how values are 
perceived as changing over time and across age groups, we 
cannot yet state precisely why this happens. Future research 
should address some important theoretical and empirical 
questions that follow from our findings.
First, it would be valuable to consider what contexts peo-
ple think about when judging their values over time. We did 
not find any difference by constraining the past and future 
time points (Study 4), which implies our initially situationally 
unconstrained temporal methodology did not lead to greater 
use of concrete instantiations compared to standard measures. 
But this possibility cannot be ruled out completely, and future 
studies could ask people to report the cognitions underlying 
their perceived value trajectories.
The concern of participants using varying contexts to de-
cide upon value importance would of course also be relevant 
to the standard measures, where tensions are regularly found 
(Schwartz et al., 2012). However, contextual shifts could be 
valuable in understanding why younger people reported up-
ward change in theoretically opposing values—does think-
ing about values in the future allow for greater variability in 
the range of instantiation contexts considered (e.g., I will be 
more concerned for others in a family context, but I will also 
be more concerned with myself in a vocational context)? It 
would be valuable to know whether considering values over 
time leads to instantiations that are more concrete or diverse, 
and whether any such tendencies are also moderated by age. 
Additionally, our designs did not directly ask participants 
about whether or not they perceived opposition in pursuing 
conflicting values (e.g., wealth and equality). To increase our 
understanding of how people view such conflicts, it would 
therefore be useful to examine the extent to which partici-
pants see this as problematic when directly confronted.
Second, to allow comparable analyses across our sam-
ples we used behavioral intentions via top-down constructed 
items to assess the predictive validity of future value impor-
tance. While our results demonstrate that future values show 
promise as a better predictor of intentions than current val-
ues, these findings would benefit from extension. Similar to 
the previous point about value instantiations, further research 
could explore which contexts participants are considering 
when thinking about future actions. All values measures as-
sess assigned importance to broad and abstract ideals, how-
ever, past research has shown that the effects of values also 
depend a great deal on the specific concrete instantiations 
of the values that are brought to mind (Maio,  2016; Maio, 
Hahn, et al., 2009). A further useful test would be to exam-
ine whether future values predict behavior better than present 
values in a longitudinal design.
Third, the changing trajectories across age groups show 
where life stage has an impact on the perception of values 
over time. Values can change for two interconnected rea-
sons: internal (a shift in motivation) and external (a shift in 
context). The suggested future directions above could also 
be used to explore how participants approach the temporal 
values measure across the lifespan. Our finding that older 
participants, unlike their younger counterparts, do report 
opposing trajectories for self-enhancement and self-tran-
scendence is worthy of particular attention. Does greater 
life experience lead to people realizing they cannot “have 
it all” (a shift in internal motivation)? Or do changes in life 
circumstances lead to different things mattering (a shift in 
external context)? Given the importance of understanding 
the social context within which values and well-being in-
teract (Burr et al., 2011), it would be informative to track 
how perceived variability in values over time might be 
moderated by different life experiences.
Fourth, our findings relating value trajectories to well-be-
ing are intriguing, though the effect sizes are small, in line 
with previous research (e.g., Oishi et al., 1999). The fact that 
the relationships appear more consistent in the larger, more 
representative sample is reassuring in terms of reliability. 
Our operationalization is, however, a general and conserva-
tive test of this association, since it cannot account for how 
participants interpret the changes over time. A more detailed 
examination could ask participants to assess whether they 
see their changes as generally positive (e.g., fulfilled desire, 
aspiration) or negative (e.g., regret, dissatisfaction), and any 
such moderation would improve our understanding of how 
variability in values can impact upon well-being. It is also 
noteworthy that, in both studies examining well-being, we 
replicated research showing higher self-transcendence and 
openness values in general correlate with higher levels of 
well-being (Burr et al., 2011; Deci & Ryan, 1995; Kasser & 
Ahuvia, 2002; Sortheix & Schwartz, 2017).
There are further important implications for understand-
ing temporal value projections alongside other research do-
mains. For instance, people can show dispositional variation 
in their tendency to focus on different temporal parts of their 
lives (Barber et al., 2009), and it would be worth seeing if 
such tendencies moderate our findings by using a standard-
ized measure of time perspective (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). 
For example, those who tend to focus more on the future 
might report smaller discrepancies between current and 
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future value importance, or find it easier to accommodate 
potential value conflict in their future values. Indeed, the per-
ceived distance between the current self and other time points 
matters in self-projection (Wilson et al., 2012), and there may 
be implications for well-being, as our findings linking value 
variability and well-being indicate.
Furthermore, many studies have shown that temporal per-
spective can be manipulated for potential positive impact. 
Creativity, self-control, and life-satisfaction have all been 
shown to increase as a result of taking a more abstract, dis-
tant perspective (Burgoon et  al.,  2013). Similarly, various 
methods of focussing on the future have increased long-term 
thinking (Liu & Aaker, 2007), academic achievement (Barber 
et al., 2009), idealism (Kivetz & Tyler, 2007), pro-environmen-
tal engagement (Pahl & Bauer, 2013), and self-transcendence 
values (Joireman & Duell, 2005), while also protecting against 
negative affective responses (Namkoong & Henderson, 2014). 
Our data demonstrate a strong increase in the importance at-
tached to openness values when using the temporal values 
measure (Study 2), which is a promising indicator of the po-
tential to use this method to encourage horizon scanning.
7.2 | Conclusion
In sum, the four studies reported here provide consistent 
evidence that people see their values as changing over time. 
With the exception of conservation values, younger people 
generally believe that they are increasing the importance of 
all their values over time. Most individuals' visions of change 
are not consistent with the tensions across value dimensions 
that have been consistently found in previous research. This 
inconsistency means younger people might be unaware of the 
potential problems of trying to concurrently pursue oppos-
ing life goals. However, people in older age groups report 
a different pattern that importantly shows some evidence of 
recognizing value opposition, with rising self-transcendence 
values being somewhat offset by falling self-enhancement 
values. These data open a number of intriguing empirical 
pathways questioning our perception of value change over 
time and across the lifespan, while showing that a tempo-
ral measure of values can be useful in predicting well-being 
and future intentions, as well as encouraging openness. With 
further development and research, the method of asking par-
ticipants to reflect on their values in the past, now, and in the 
future may allow people to use their values more powerfully 
and in a more fulfilling manner.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The authors declared no potential conflicting interests with 
respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this 
article.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Preparation of this manuscript was supported by the Economic 
and Social Research Council UK (ESRC-1013799). The au-
thors would also like to thank Geoff Haddock for his support 
in the production of this paper.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The data that support the findings of this study are openly 
available in OSF at: https://osf.io/j56tr/ ?view_only=29857 
ace11 e14ca f9240 0d0d3 1f7adb4.
ORCID
Colin M. G. Foad   https://orcid.
org/0000-0003-0423-2848 
ENDNOTES
 1 Analyses for Study 1and Study 2 revealed the PFC had no significant 
effects, it is thus mentioned here for procedural completeness, but is 
not discussed in the results sections. 
 2 We also piloted a scrambled sentences priming manipulation in Study 
1, mentioned here for procedural completeness. Analyses revealed no 
significant effects. No conclusions can be drawn from these data, as 
the study was not adequately powered to detect the effect sizes that 
are generally reported in the values priming literature. It is thus not 
discussed in the results section. 
 3 Ten items provided scenarios that reflected germane behaviors for 
a student sample (e.g., deciding which career to pursue; voting in a 
student election). These items asked participants to think about each 
scenario and consider how their decision would be driven by personal 
interest versus the needs of others. These items were designed to ex-
amine behavioral examples in the self-transcendence—self-enhance-
ment dimension of values, after our critical values-over-time measure 
had been completed. Answers were provided on a scale from 1 (en-
tirely driven by personal interests) to 9 (entirely driven by the needs 
of others). They are mentioned here for procedural completeness, but 
are not discussed in the results section. 
 4 Analyses were not affected by the ages participants provided and are 
thus not discussed further. Additional analyses describing relevant 
zero-order correlations are available in Supporting Information. 
 5 We also assessed whether the typical circular value structure holds 
within each time point of the temporal values measure. Our mul-
tidimensional scaling analyses suggest that it does (see Figures 
S1–S4). 
 6 The political measure was of secondary interest and not discussed 
further here for parsimony. Results are in Supporting Information 
(Tables S7 and S8). 
 7 We report a series of ANOVAs rather than moderated regressions 
with age as a continuous predictor to be consistent with Studies 1–3 
and to allow past, present, and future time points to be evaluated si-
multaneously, as the task required. However, for those interested in 
analyses that use age as a continuous variable, moderated regressions 
with age as the predictor, time as a moderator (past vs. present, and 
present vs. future), and value importance as outcome, these are re-
ported in the Supporting Information (Tables S10 and S11 for raw 
and centred value scores, respectively). 
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